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Sammanfattning 
 
Titel:  CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? – A 
Study of the Swedish Market 
 
Seminariedatum: 03/06/2009 
 
Ämne/kurs:  BUSM36 Degree Project Corporate and Financial 
Management (15ECTS) 
 
Författare:   Christian Bjärntoft, Olle Hammer 
 
Handledare:   Maria Gårdängen 
 
Nyckelord:  VD:s aktieinnehav, Tobin‟s Q, endogeneitet, agentteorin, 
entrenchment-teorin 
 
Syfte:  Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om och hur en 
VD:s aktieinnehav påverkar företagets prestation beroende 
på om det är baisse eller hausse på den svenska 
aktiemarknaden. Vidare ämnar vi undersöka om detta 
eventuella samband håller även då vi undersöker om 
relationen är endogenetiskt bestämd. 
 
Metod:  Uppsatsen bygger på en kvantitativ metod och använder 
regressionsanalys samt deskriptiv statistik för att analysera 
orsakssambandet. Sambanden modellerades med hjälp av 
OLS- samt Two-stage Least Square regressioner. Datan 
hämtades främst från årsredovisningar och Datastream. 
Studien har en deduktiv ansats. 
 
Teoretisk referensram:  Den teoretiska referensramen består främst av den klassiska 
agentteorin samt entrenchment-teorin.  
 
Empiriskt material:  Företag listade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large och Mid 
Cap mellan 2000 och 2006 har empiriskt undersökts. 
Undersökningen baseras på årsdata. 
 
Slutsats:  Resultaten från OLS-regressionerna konfirmerar ett positivt 
samband mellan företagsprestation och en VD:s 
aktieinnehav på den svenska marknaden. Sambandet håller 
under baisseperioden (2000-2002) och för hela 
undersökningsperioden (2000-2006). Dock är sambandet 
inte statistiskt säkerställt för hausseperioden (2003-2006). 
Resultatet antyder att rådande marknadsläge på 
aktiemarknaden påverkar sambandet, således har externa 
krafter en påverkan på resultatet.  En Two-stage least square 
regression genomfördes för att undersöka om sambandet 
kunde vara endogenetiskt bestämt och slutsatsen är då att 
sambandet inte håller. 
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Abstract 
 
Title:   CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
Seminar date: 03/06/2009 
 
Course:  BUSM36 Degree Project Corporate and Financial 
Management (15ECTS) 
 
Authors:   Christian Bjärntoft, Olle Hammer 
 
Advisor:   Maria Gårdängen 
 
Key words:  CEO ownership, Tobin‟s Q, endogeneity, agency theory, 
entrenchment theory 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this thesis is to examine if and how CEO 
ownership affects firm performance on Swedish companies 
depending on the market conditions. We would also like to 
examine the question if this relationship still holds when 
taking the possibility of an endogeneity determined 
relationship into account.  
 
Methodology:  A quantitative approach using regression analysis and 
descriptive statistics have been used. The regression 
analysis was conducted with an ordinary least square 
regression and a two-stage least square regression. The 
information has been attained from annual reports and 
Datastream. The study has a deductive approach 
 
Theoretical perspectives:  The theoretical perspective has been derived from classical 
agency theory as well as entrenchment theory.  
 
Empirical foundation:  Companies listed at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large and 
Mid Cap during 2000-2006 has been empirically studied to 
obtain the data selected.  
 
Conclusions:  Results from OLS regressions confirms a positive relation 
between firm performance and CEO ownership on the 
Swedish market. The relationship holds for our bear market 
period (2000-2002) as well as for the whole period (2000-
2006). During bull market the relationship cannot be 
statistically supported. The results imply that the market 
condition affects the relationship; hence external forces 
have an impact on the result. Thus a Two-stage least square 
regression was conducted in order to examine if the 
relationship could be endogeneity determined and the result 
is that the relationship could be determined by exogenous 
forces and thus; the relationship do not hold.  
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1. Introduction 
  
 
In the introductory section, background and motives behind the research will be 
explained which will lead forward to the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, key 
definitions, delimitations as well as target audience and disposition of the thesis 
will be presented. 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
During the past year, the debate and criticism about CEO bonuses and incentive 
programs has increased in strength when the economic downturn and recession hit 
the world economy (Linnala, 2009). Executives with decision power have been 
accused for entrenching themselves with corporate perks. Along with the 
increasing masses of criticism, the economic downturn has had consequences for 
individual firms‟ profits as well as for their stock prices. Many shareholders, 
including CEOs with large ownership, have experienced a dramatic decrease in 
the value of their shares.   
 
Generally during these bearish market conditions, focus shifts from 
shortsightedness to long-term perspective. In such economic climate, we believe 
that strong leadership showing confidence in the company is an important factor 
in the search for improved firm performance. High confidence could be 
represented trough increased CEO ownership in the company, at least if choosing 
to believe the classic agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Swedish CEOs 
following this belief are considered to be a part of the famous Pilot School
1
 
(Zaudy, 2008). 
                                               
1 The pilot school builds on the agency theory which says that the company‟s CEO, who is the 
“corporate pilot”, should buy stocks in the own company and thereby showing confidence in the 
company‟s future profits. 
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The CEO of the Swedish company Ericsson, Carl-Henric Svanberg, is one of the 
leading men following the Pilot School (Zachrisson, 2008). When Svanberg 
started as CEO, the company had problems with their business model and 
declining firm performance. Svanberg bought a large stake in the company and 
subsequently firm performance increased (Hedensjö, 2004). The question arises 
whether level of CEO ownership affects firm performance or not? 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion  
All shareholders are entitled to the same dividend per share, but insiders, such as 
the CEOs, have incentives to make investments and financing policies that benefit 
themselves but affect other shareholders negatively. This potential negative 
behavior can be explained by the game theory stating that all actors aim to 
maximize their own utility (Bernoulli, 1738). To align the CEO‟s interest with the 
shareholders‟ interest the CEO has to own shares in the own company. In that way 
the firm performance depends on the amount of shares owned by the CEO. 
According to agency theory, the greater level of ownership by the CEO, the 
greater firm performance is (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Morck et al. 
(1988) argues that after a certain limit of ownership, the positive effect disappears 
and the relationship turns negative and the CEO starts to entrench herself with 
high salary and other corporate perks.  
 
Previous studies examining the relation between insider ownership and firm 
performance have shown mixed empirical results. Some of them indicate no 
relationship at all (e.g. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999), while others (e.g. 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999) have found a strong relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. There are also studies 
suggesting that the relationship is reverse, i.e. firm performance have an effect on 
insider ownership and not vice versa. Kole (1996) and Cho (1998) showed that 
firm performance had an impact on insider ownership and thus stating that a 
reversed causality exists in the relationship. This implies that when the CEO 
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believes firm performance will increase, the CEO increases her equity stake. 
(Kole, 1996) 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) conclude that the differing results, providing 
different empirical evidence, stem from different measurements of variables, time 
periods and different techniques. To further examine the relationship between 
insider ownership and firm performance Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
examined if ownership structure was an endogeneity determined factor. Demsetz 
(1983) argued that in a competitive and efficient marketplace forces will make 
sure that every company chooses the most value maximizing ownership structure. 
This means that the ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of decisions 
that reflect the influence of shareholders, i.e. there should be no systematic 
relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm 
performance.   
 
What we believe is the only study on the Swedish market examining the 
relationship insider ownership and firm performance has some weaknesses. 
Olsson and Öhlén‟s (2007) study found a significant relationship between relative 
CEO ownership above 3 % and firm performance, however they did not examine 
whether ownership was an endogeneity determined factor. Welch (2003) studied 
the same relationship on the Australian market and found a significant relation 
between insider ownership and firm performance, however when endogeneity was 
accounted for, there was no significant relationship.  
 
None of the previous studies, as far as we know, take into consideration the fact 
that the current market condition might affect the relationship CEO ownership and 
firm performance. We believe, however, that the market conditions, whether it is 
bull or bear market, could have an impact on the relationship. Agrawal et al. 
(1987) found that level of leverage tends to increase with increased CEO 
ownership. This is in line with free-cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), stating 
that increased leverage mitigate agency problems and thereby increases firm 
performance. Furthermore, it has been concluded that the level of leverage in turn 
is affected by market conditions (Murray and Goyal, 2004) and since level of 
leverage is affected by the market condition as well as the amount of CEO 
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ownership, leverage has an impact on firm performance. Hence, we believe the 
level of CEO ownership will affect firm performance differently during different 
market conditions. 
 
Lastly, we are supposedly alone in taking endogeneity as well as different market 
conditions into consideration in our study of the link between CEO ownership and 
firm performance, this factor induce the importance of our study. 
 
1.3 Problem Definition 
How does the level of CEO ownership affect firm performance (Tobin‟s Q) and is 
there a difference depending on whether it is a bull or bear market? If endogeneity 
is accounted for, will the results still hold? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine if and how CEO ownership affects firm 
performance on the Swedish market under different market conditions. In a 
second stage we will examine if the relationship is endogeneity determined. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
Companies not founded in Sweden will be excluded since we only want to 
examine Swedish companies. Banks are excluded because of the complexity 
coupled with their balance sheets making it difficult to calculate some of the 
relevant measures, this is due to the fact that operating and financing activities are 
mixed and therefore the debt-level might not be accurate.  
 
Our study is limited to only include the years between 2000 and 2006, which 
consist of one bear market and one bull market period. The reason for this 
delimitation is due to the time frame of this study. This study is delimitated to 
examine companies on the Swedish stock exchange Nasdaq OMX Large and Mid 
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Cap. In other words, we have chosen not to examine Small Cap and the reason for 
this is also due to the short time frame for this thesis. 
 
1.6 Definitions 
Bear market – There is no formal definition of a Bear market period. However the 
informal definition is a drop of 20 % or more and it is expected periodically to 
correct an excesses found in a late stage of a bull market. In our study we use the 
period from, post it-bubble, year 2000 to 2002. During this period the Swedish 
OMXS Benchmark index dropped 49% from the top in 2000 until the bottom in 
year 2002.  
 
Bull Market – There is no formal definition of a Bull market period either. 
However the informal definition is a period where stock prices rise faster than the 
average historical price change. In our study we use the period from 2003 until 
2006. During this period the Swedish OMXS Benchmark index sky-rocked with 
an increase of 138 %.  
 
Endogeneity – Demsetz (1983) argues that ownership structure is an endogenous 
outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders, i.e. there should be 
no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in 
firm performance. This phenomenon occurs in a regression model when one 
independent variable is correlated with the error term (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). 
 
Term Definition 
CEO Chief executive officer 
Tobin's Q Firm performance = 
 
Size Market Capitalization 
Leverage Book value debt/equity-ratio 
Relative ownership Percent of company owned by CEO 
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Absolute ownership SEK value of shares held by CEO 
OLS Ordinary least square regression 
2SLS Two-stage least square regression 
Bear market period 2000-2002 
Bull market period 2003-2006 
 
1.7 Disposition 
Chapter two gives an overview of the relevant theoretical framework that is used 
as a base in this thesis; we will also provide the reader with a compilation over the 
recent research regarding the relationship firm performance and insider 
ownership. In the third chapter our data gathering, methodology and course of 
action for this study is presented and evaluated. In the fourth chapter we will, due 
to the nature of this study, combine the empirical findings from descriptive 
statistics as well as regression models with the analysis of the findings. In the fifth 
and last chapter a conclusion of the compiled analysis and suggestion for future 
research is presented. 
 
1.8 Target Audience 
This thesis is intended for students, academics, investors and professionals that 
have an interest in the question regarding the relationship between Swedish 
CEO‟s ownership and a firm‟s performance. The reader should have basic 
knowledge in corporate finance, statistics and econometrics. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In the second chapter the theoretical framework connected to the topic of this 
thesis will be presented. This section will provide analytical tools and academic 
theories that will form a strong theoretical base for understanding and for 
analyzing the empirical findings, all provided in chapter four. 
 
 
 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In 1970 Eugene Fama published The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which 
states that in an active market, the market price of a financial instrument should 
reflect all available information such as historical prices, public information as 
well as insider information. All investors are assumed to be rational which means 
that the market correctly prices all securities. Furthermore, it means that all 
attempts to outperform the market with portfolio management are meaningless in 
the long run. Fama divides the effectiveness of the market into three forms 
reflecting available information; weak, semi-strong and strong market efficiency.  
 
If the Efficient Market hypothesis holds, and investors know that higher CEO 
ownership results in better performance, it would be included in the stock price 
immediately and no abnormal returns would be found. However, Shleifer (2000) 
among others concludes that financial markets should not be considered efficient. 
He means that numerous studies show the opposite and that investors often 
underreact to corporate news announcements. This means that EMH is violated, 
and that, for example, CEO ownership announcements are not always priced into 
the stock. Since firm performance, measured as Tobin‟s Q, is dependent on stock 
returns the impact of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is of interest. 
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2.2 CEO Utility Maximization 
Financial theory assumes that all actors in a market act upon rational behavior. An 
individual actor‟s optimal choice depends on what she believes other actors will 
choose. This is explained by Game Theory, where strategic interactions between 
rational actors produce outcome dependent on each actor‟s utility and/or 
preference (Bernoulli, 1738). Normative decision theory suggests that the actors 
are economically rational which means that she can (i) asses outcomes, (ii) 
calculate the alternatives paths to outcome and that she can (iii) choose an action 
that yields her most-preferred outcome based on her individual decision 
(Bernoulli, 1738). The conclusion of game theory is that the actor will maximize 
her own utility (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1944). Individual utility 
maximization leads us into the relation between a CEO and her alignment of 
interest with shareholders. 
 
2.3 The Relation of CEO Ownership and Firm Performance  
Two theories suggest different optimal CEO ownership levels. The agency theory 
suggests that due to the incentive alignment as a shareholder, a CEO with large 
ownership will act in the best interest of the company (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The managerial entrenchment theory however suggests that when the 
CEO‟s ownership increases, she will behave in a non-firm value maximizing way, 
trying to entrench herself with high salary and corporate perks (Demsetz, 1983). 
Recent research (Welch, 2003) suggests that the relation between CEO ownership 
and firm performance is endogeneity determined which implies that the 
relationship could be false. 
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment Theory 
Berle and Means (1932) were first to identify a potential conflict between a 
company owner and its management. This situation arises when the management 
does not have any interest in the company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined 
this agency relation as a contract where the owner(s) (principal) hires a CEO 
(agent) to act and perform in a way that aligns with the owner‟s interest. If both 
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parties are utility maximizing, it is rational to think that the CEO will not always 
act in the best interest of the owner and she may search for a variety of personal 
interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also define two groups of shareholders, the 
first group which has decision-making authority, i.e. CEO with an ownership in 
the company, and the second one which does not have these types of authorities. 
These two groups are defined as insider and outsider shareholders.  
 
Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) conclude that when separation between 
decision-making authority and ownership exist in a company, agency costs will 
arise since owners, who have residual claim on the company, need to control and 
monitor the decision management. Agency theories suggest that increasing 
monitoring costs, e.g. through incentive programs, will lead to a lower 
performance and a less profitable company. Moreover, when CEO ownership is 
low, the CEO will have lesser incentives to act in the shareholders best interest, 
which creates incentives for the CEO to divert resources to benefit her over 
shareholders (Blackburn et al. 1990). Other consequences are behavior such as 
empire building and investments in projects that increase firm size but without 
increasing the firm performance (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2007), thus making decisions 
that are not value-maximizing. However, if the CEO has ownership in the 
company, her interest will be aligned with the shareholders in that what benefits 
herself will benefit shareholders; this implies that she will act in the best interest 
of the company (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
In summary, agency theory argues that the greater degree of ownership by the 
CEO, the better performance and profitability by the company, this is also called 
the incentive alignment theory. Criticism to the agency theory is that it assumes 
that individuals and organizations only are interested in maximizing their own 
self-interest and thereby ignoring the complexities surrounding an organizational 
life. However the relationship principal-agent should not be examined as an 
isolated phenomenon, instead one should take into account the surrounding 
environment. Factors such as social and political aspects should be considered in 
the complex environment surrounding an organization and thus the relationship 
between principal and agent is simplified in the agency theory. (Fama, 1980; 
Scott, 2003)  
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2.3.2 Managerial Entrenchment Theory  
Demsetz (1983) pointed out costs of significant CEO ownership such as high 
salary and empire building. When the CEO owns none or only a small equity 
stake in the company she is working for, market discipline such as the managerial 
labour market (Fama, 1980) and the market for corporate control (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983) may still force her to maximize firm value. However, if the CEO 
has a large ownership stake, that induces power and control enough to secure and 
guarantee high salary and her own employment, it would have a negative effect on 
firm performance (Morck et al 1988). A high level of stock ownership by the 
CEO leads to corporate decisions that are not maximizing firm performance due 
to entrenchment possibilities. That means that the CEO has the opportunity to 
expropriate other shareholders and entrench herself with high salary, empire 
building and corporate perks (Demsetz 1983; Morck et al 1988).  
 
Entrenchment theory also suggests that decision monitoring will decrease when 
the ownership level by the CEO increases (Miguel, Pindado, and De La Torre 
2004; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994). This means that the CEO will be given more 
freedom to “do what she wants” with the company, which will further increase the 
entrenchment by the CEO. Han and Suk (1998) provided another empirical 
evidence of the entrenchment theory when they looked at the impact of inside 
ownership in a sample of 5500 companies over a four-year period and concluded 
that excessive insider control negatively impacted the firm performance.  
 
To summarize the entrenchment theory, in contradiction to the incentive 
alignment theory, suggests that the higher level of CEO ownership, the more 
likely will the performance of the company decrease and the assets will be less 
valuable due to the entrenchment possibilities. The criticism that has been put 
forward against this theory is the same reasoning as with the agency theory. The 
entrenchment theory simplifies the relationship in an organization and fails to take 
into account the complexities with social and political aspects regarding 
relationships in an organization (Fama, 1980; Scott, 2003). 
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2.4 Literature Review  
Main theories presented above have been discussed and empirically tested over 
the last decades; the main studies within the area will now be presented. Demsetz 
(1983) argued against Berle and Means (1932) theory that there is a relation 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Instead, Demsetz (1983) 
argue that in a competitive and efficient market place forces will make sure that 
every company chooses the most value maximizing ownership structure. In other 
words; the CEO ownership is an endogeneity determined variable and any 
observed correlation between ownership and firm performance could be false. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) were first to empirically test if this was true and 
conducted an OLS regression, the results supported Demsetz‟ (1983) theory. 
 
Morck, Schleifner and Vishny (1988) support Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) 
theory that there is a relation between insider ownership and firm performance. 
They examined 371 American companies and used Tobin‟s Q as a measure of 
firm performance and insider ownership as combined shareholdings of all board 
members with a minimum ownership of 0.2 %. Their result, after running a 
piecewise linear regression, is that there is a significant non-monotonic relation 
and that firm performance is increasing between 0-5 % ownership stake, 
decreasing between 5-25 % and finally increasing beyond 25 %. Morck et al. 
(1988) did not take into account that the relationship could be endogeneity 
determined. 
 
McConnel and Servaes (1990) ran an OLS regression to examine the relation 
between Tobin‟s Q and insider ownership in two different samples with two time 
periods. However, they had not chosen the time periods dependent on specific 
market conditions. They found a positive relation for ownership up to a breaking 
point between ownership levels of 40-50%. Thereafter, as the ownership increased 
further there was a negative effect on firm performance. These findings suggest 
that the incentive alignment theory as well as the entrenchment theory co-exist but 
Demsetz (1983) argumentations regarding the endogeneity problem are not taken 
into account. McConnel and Servaes (1990) thus suggest that the relationship 
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between insider ownership and firm performance is curve linear and shaped as an 
inverse-U. 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) did take into account the endogeneity problem 
and their results support Morck et al. (1988) findings. They found that Tobin‟s Q 
increases with insider ownership up to 1 %, then the relation is negative between 
1-5%, then it becomes positive between 5-20% and finally it turns negative 
beyond 20%. This evidence further supports both the incentive alignment theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the entrenchment theory (Demsetz, 1983). 
 
Furthermore, Kole (1996) also accounted for an endogeneity determined 
relationship which he grounded on the fact that the relationship was the opposite, 
i.e. the ownership structure was dependent on the firm performance. Moreover, 
Cho (1998) first replicated Morck et al.’s (1988) study and found a similar non-
monotonic relation between Tobin‟s Q and management ownership. Then he also 
accounted for whether ownership structure was endogeneity determined and 
found that firm performance could have an effect on the ownership structure but 
not the other way around and thereby supporting Kole (1996). 
  
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) extended Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study 
by using a fixed effects panel data model and concluded that almost all variation 
in CEO ownership can be explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity and that 
CEO ownership has no significant effect on firm performance. This result is 
interpreted as a support and empirical evidence on Demsetz‟ (1983) theory. 
 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) replicated earlier studies by Morck et 
al. (1988) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and found support for Morck et al. 
(1988) results, showing a positive relation between firm performance and insider 
ownership from 0 to 5% ownership level. They could not, however, find a 
significant relation beyond 5 % ownership. Holderness et al. (1999) also 
confirmed the endogeneity of insider ownership. 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) re-examined earlier studies and found that when 
taking endogeneity into account, which they did by running a Two-least square 
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regression, there was no significant relation between insider ownership and firm 
performance. They also suggest that earlier research inconsistency in variable 
measurement, time periods and failure of researchers to acknowledge the 
endogeneity problem, may provide an explanation for the failure to reach a 
consensus.  
 
Welch (2003) replicated Demsetz and Villalonga´s study (2001) on the Australian 
market. She used an OLS regression and found a significant relationship between 
firm performance and ownership structure, which support Morck et al. (1988). 
However when endogeneity was taken into account in a Two-stage least square 
model, Welch (2003) found no statistic evidence of the positive relation between 
firm performance and ownership, further supporting Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001). 
 
2.5 Concluding Comments 
There are two schools with opposing views suggesting different relationship 
between CEO ownership and firm performance. Morck et al. (1988) state that 
both the incentive alignment theory and the entrenchment theory co-exist and that 
higher level of ownership increases firm performance, due to the CEOs alignment 
with the owner‟s interest, and that firm performance later decreases due to the 
entrenchment possibilities. Morck et al.’s model has been empirically studied and 
the results support and is interpreted as evidence on the positive relation between 
firm performance and insider ownership up to a certain limit where it turns 
negative (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999).  
 
The second school, however, argues against Morck et al.´s (1988) findings of a 
positive relation between CEO ownership and firm performance. Demsetz (1983) 
argues that any such relationship is determined by other factors, e.g. the market 
forces. Academic researches, acknowledging Demsetz‟ (1983) theory and taking 
the endogeneity problem into account, have not found a consensus regarding the 
relation between firm performance and insider ownership. Some studies (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Holderness et al., 1999) have found a significant 
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relation even when the endogeneity problem has been accounted for and others 
(e.g. Loderer and Martin, 1997; Kole, 1996; Cho, 1998, Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Welch, 2003) have found no significant relation. 
 
Table 2: Research regarding the relationship insider ownership and firm 
performance 
 
 
(Demsetz and Villonga, 2001) 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) concludes that the lack of consensus in the 
academic research regarding the relationship, firm performance and insider 
ownership, could be due to different research methods, time periods and measure 
of variables (table 2). This should be thought of when comparing previous results 
with the result from our study on the Swedish market. 
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3. Methodology 
  
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used when examining the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO ownership. The research approach, the data 
gathering process and criticism on methodology will also be presented.  
 
 
 
3.1 Research Approach 
Previous studies within the area, covering the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm performance, have used a number of different methodologies   
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Our aim is to empirically study if CEO 
ownership has any impact on firm performance and since previous research will 
be used to evaluate and analyze our findings, this study is considered to have a 
deductive approach (Bryman and Bell, 2003). When examining this relationship 
we primarily use a regression model. Regression models can be used to (i) test 
how much of the dependent variable that can be explained by the fluctuations in 
the independent variables, described with as high determination coefficient (R
2
) as 
possible and to (ii) test if the independent variable has any effect on the dependent 
variable. Our regression model is primarily used for the second purpose. (Brooks, 
2002) 
 
In our regression model a log-normal form is used, which will show sensitivity, or 
elasticity, in terms of percentage changes instead of in absolute terms. This 
method is chosen as it makes it easier to interpret the results which in turn will 
lead to a more comprehensive analysis.  
 
Furthermore, as a complement to the regression analysis and to provide the reader 
with better understanding of our data and the analysis, descriptive statistics will be 
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provided. The descriptive statistics analysis is also conducted to identify possible 
outliers. The analysis is generated in the statistical program SPSS and the sample 
are divided by years and by quartiles. 
 
3.2 Data Gathering 
We chose to gather data from companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large and Mid Cap. Olson and Öhlén (2007) used only 
data from companies on Large Cap, and to further improve their study we want to 
extend the sample they used. Due to the short time frame we chose to exclude 
companies on the Small Cap. The collected data covers the period 2000 to 2006, 
which includes a bear market (2000-2002) and a bull market period (2003-2006) 
(Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: OMXS benchmark, Bear and Bull market 
 
(DI, 2009) 
 
Even though we could have used more data and extended the time period we 
chose not to, due to lack of time. Companies that have not been listed the entire 
period and companies where all figures are not available are excluded to ensure 
reliability. As our intention is to examine the two different periods there will be 
196 observations covering the bear market (2000-2002) and 265 observations 
covering the bull market (2003-2006). However, after descriptive statistics has 
been conducted, five more companies are excluded due to extreme deviations. 
Hence, our regression analysis is based on 64 companies in total and 181 
observations in our bear market period and finally 246 observations in our bull 
market period. Our sample is unbalanced, thus some observations are lacking. 
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Sources that have been used for data gathering were primarily Datastream and 
annual reports. Datastream is one of the world‟s largest financial databases and it 
is used by academics, financial institutions and banks worldwide and therefore it 
forms a secure and reliable source (Thomson Datastream). The variables gathered 
from Datastream are Size, Leverage and inputs for Tobin‟s Q. Our data is 
considered secondary quantitative data. 
 
Annual reports are the second source of information we have used in this study 
and their reliability is based on the Swedish corporate law foundation. All 
Swedish public companies are mandatory to have an auditor scrutinize and finally 
give her approval of its reliability (Aktiebolagslag, 2005:551). We are also aware 
that Swedish CEOs could have shareholdings in foreign insurance products. This 
implies that the correct CEO shareholdings could deviate from the amount of 
shares presented in annual reports even though the CEO shareholdings are double 
checked with Ägarna och makten by Fristedt and Sundqvist (1999-2006). This 
series of books is published by the Swedish Securities Register Center (SIS 
Ägarservice) and provide a complete register of all publicly listed companies on 
the Swedish stock exchange and its largest owners. Sweden is unique with such a 
comprehensive compilation of ownership structures, and thus our study is deemed 
reliable with high validity (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). The information about 
CEO stock- and option holdings is gathered manually from annual reports for all 
69 companies in the sample. 
 
3.3 Choice of Regression Model  
Since our observations cover both a cross-sectional and time series dimension, i.e. 
panel data, we use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model. The OLS 
model is the most commonly used regression model (Gujarati, 2006). In this 
study, the panel data consists of 64 companies with annual observations between 
2000 and 2006 covering different variables that change over time. This means that 
five companies are excluded after the descriptive statistics analysis, due to 
extreme values (section 4.1.4); hence our regression analysis includes 427 
observations. Our panel data is characterized as dated and regular since we have 
CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
24 
 
frequent annual observations without exceptions. That is when the cell 
identifications are defined by a variable like year and the cell identification values 
follow a regular frequency.  
 
The usage of panel data require fewer observations which will enable us to detect 
additional features of the data relative to pure cross-sectional and times series 
samples. Furthermore, panel data enable us to study adjustments of the dependent 
variable in response to changes in the independent variables. (Brooks, 2002)  
 
Earlier studies have also used an OLS regression to find a potential relationship 
between ownership and firm performance (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003). 
Since we are also testing for a possible endogeneity determined relationship 
(Demsetz, 1983), we will in addition use a two-stage least square (S2LS) 
regression model. The 2SLS model is used in Demsetz and Villalonga‟s (2001) 
study as well as in Welch (2003) to determine if ownership is an endogeneity 
determined factor. The basic idea behind the two-stage least square model is to 
replace the explanatory variable that is correlated with the error term of the 
equation by a variable that is less correlated (Gujarati, 2006). Such a variable is 
called instrumental variable and these will be chosen and argued for in section 
3.4.2 Running the regression.  
 
Our regression model could be stated as follows: 
 
LQit = β0+ β1LROit+β2LAOit+β3LSIZEit+β4LDEit+ β5LMRit+β6Oit+εit 
Where:  
 
Qit = Tobin‟s Q as a measure of firm performance  
β0 = Expected firm value if all factors i are equal to zero  
RO = Relative ownership in company i in time t  
AO = Absolute ownership in company i in time t  
SIZE = Size in terms of market capitalization in company i in time t  
DE = Book debt-to-equity ratio in company i in time t  
MR = Market return in time t  
O = Dummy variable, 1=CEO holds options and 0=all other, in company i in time t  
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εit = a stochastic variable with mean of zero.  
L = Natural logarithm, LN 
 
How these variables are calculated will be further described in the next 
section.  
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Firm Performance  
In all previous studies, except for Demsetz and Lehn‟s (1985), examining the 
relationship between ownership and firm performance, the firm performance 
variable has been measured as Tobin‟s Q. Demsetz and Lehn used accounting 
profit rate as a measure and some other studies (Morck et al, 1988; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001) have used both Tobin‟s Q and an accounting measure.  
 
There are two aspects to consider when deciding on what performance measure to 
use. First of all between a forward-looking measure such as Tobin‟s Q or a 
backward-looking measure as an accounting profit rate. Secondly, the question is 
who is actually measuring performance. For the accounting profit rates it is the 
accountant constrained by her profession and laws, and for Tobin‟s Q it is the 
market actors which reflect the market conditions. However, we believe that since 
market valuation reflects both historical and future performance and the fact that 
high accounting profits often are accompanied by high market valuation, it is our 
belief, which is in line with Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), that these two 
measures should be correlated. Their result concludes a simple correlation of 0.60 
between profit rate and Tobin‟s Q, which means the variables are fairly correlated. 
The strongest argument in favour of using the Tobin‟s Q as a performance 
measure is however that, all research in this area following Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), has used Tobin‟s Q as the performance measure examining the ownership 
and firm performance relationship. Thus it will be easier when making 
comparisons with other studies. 
 
The discussion mentioned above is the reason why we chose Tobin‟s Q as a proxy 
for firm performance. The measure is calculated as the market value of equity 
subtracted by the book value of equity plus the book value of assets, this is 
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divided by the book value of assets (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). Tobin‟s Q, as 
all other variables except CEO option holding, will be in a natural logarithm form 
in the regression model.  
 
3.3.2 Independent Variable: CEO Ownership 
CEO ownership is measured in two different ways, in absolute and relative terms. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that relative ownership is the only interesting 
variable when looking at ownership and that the absolute amount of money is 
without relevance. Owning only a fraction of a company can represent a 
significant amount of money, but the risk of the actions taken by the CEO is 
predominantly held by other shareholders. This view is shared by Hall and 
Liebman (1998), though they add that it is only true for a risk neutral CEO. 
Completely risk neutral CEOs are probably not very common. Hall and Liebman 
(1998) states that when a CEO owns a large part of the company, that is a high 
absolute amount, the CEO will not be risk neutral. Further, they suggest that since 
the absolute amount is substantial, the CEO will put more emphasis on her role as 
a shareholder, thus the absolute measure is of importance. 
 
Since both these measures have been argued for in earlier research, they will both 
be included in our study on CEO ownership and its affect on firm performance. 
Annual reports are used when gathering the numbers for CEO ownership. The 
CEO ownership includes family ownership since all annual reports presented that 
instead of individual holdings.  
 
Absolute ownership:  
The absolute amount (AO in regression model) of CEO holdings is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the amount of shares owned by CEO multiplied by the 
stock price in the beginning of year t. This means that for the year 2006, the CEO 
ownership in absolute term is calculated using the amount of CEO shares in the 
end of 2005. In cases with dual share systems, the absolute amount was calculated 
using separate stock prices for A- and B-shares respectively. 
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Relative ownership:  
The relative amount (RO in regression model) of CEO holdings is measured as 
the natural logarithm of one plus the percentage of market capitalization of 
company i hold by CEO in the beginning of year t.
2
 (Brooks, 2002) 
 
3.3.3 Independent Variables for Control 
In order to deal with the fact that a number of factors can jointly affect CEO 
ownership and Tobin‟s Q, thus induce a false correlation between them, additional 
independent factors will be used in the regression for control. The motivation for 
these variables in the regression model will be argued for below. 
 
Size:  
Measured as the natural logarithm of the company i‟s market capitalization at the 
end of year t. This variable is included since its impact on firm performance has 
been concluded in earlier studies. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) examined 
firm sizes and its impact on performance in terms of stock returns and concluded 
that the relationship was statistically significant, thus Tobin‟s Q will be affected. 
Furthermore, prior research regarding size and returns concludes that the 
relationship may be partially dependent on the market conditions, which means it 
is affected by if it is bullish or bearish market conditions (Kim and Burnie 2002; 
Guo 2004). Morck et al. (1988) means that size, in terms of market value, should 
be included since unobservable intangible assets of a firm might be correlated 
with size, and that it is more difficult to own a major stake of a larger firm. 
Through this reasoning the possibility is raised that a large part of board stake 
serves as a proxy for small firm sizes. Due to these earlier studies, size in terms of 
market value should be included in the regression model as a control variable. 
 
Leverage:  
Measured as the natural logarithm of one plus company i‟s book debt-to-equity 
ratio at the end of year t. The existence of this variable in the regression model 
can be justified by different theories. First of all Agrawal et al. (1987) found that 
                                               
2 When calculating the natural logarithm of a quotient, one is added to the quotient in order to get 
the elasticity.   
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CEOs that have stock holdings tend to increase leverage. Moreover, Koller et al. 
(2005) found in empirical research that increased leverage is typically met with 
positive market reactions, a positive signalling effect, thus market value will be 
positively affected and in turn Tobin‟s Q. Further on, the pecking order theory 
suggests that when firm profitability is high, companies tend to use its retained 
earnings instead of debt financing since it is considered to be a cheaper financing 
alternative (Mayer and Majluf 1984). Lastly, it is suggested that CEOs with large 
interest in their company will try to reduce the unsystematic risk through 
diversification, which gives the possibility to increase financial risk, hence 
increase debt financing (Walters, Kroll and Wright, 2008).  
 
Market return:  
The natural logarithm of one plus the rate of return on market portfolio measured 
as Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Benchmark during year t. This variable is included 
due to its obvious impact on market values, thus impacting Tobin‟s Q. The 
variable is also of interest since we want to examine the impact of CEO ownership 
in different market conditions.   
 
CEO option holding:  
Measured as a dummy variable of 1 if the CEO of company i hold stock options in 
the beginning of year t, and 0 in all other cases. According to studies by Smith and 
Stulz's (1985) managers with greater option holdings would be less risk averse 
since option provides convex payoffs. Option values are bred by increased 
volatility, which means that a CEO with option holdings earns from being less 
risk averse. 
 
Stochastic error term:  
A stochastic error term ε is taken into consideration since all forces that affect the 
dependent variable cannot be taken into account in the regression model (Gujarati 
2006). 
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3.4 Running the Regressions 
3.4.1 OLS Regression 
As mentioned, an OLS regression is run covering the panel data during the whole 
period and the sub-periods, which is done in Eviews 6.0. The regression is 
initially run with neither fixed nor random cross sections as a start. Subsequently 
the regression is run with fixed cross-sections, where the F-statistics and the 
determination coefficient are based on the difference between the residuals sums 
of squares from the estimated model, and the sums of squares from a single-
constant seldom specification, not from a fixed-effects only specification (Eviews 
6.0 Guidebook). Hence, a test for redundant fixed effects is conducted where the 
resulting p value equals zero, implying that the regression should be run with 
fixed effects instead of no cross-sectional effects. However, we still do not know 
whether fixed or a random effects cross-section should be used in our final model. 
Therefore a model with random effects cross-sections is run, conducted with a 
correlated random effects test. This regression is using the data in a more efficient 
way and the standard errors will be less compared to a regression with fixed 
effects. The test is called the Hausman test and it evaluates the significance of an 
estimator versus an alternative estimator (Eviews 6.0 Guidebook). In the three 
different samples (total sample, bear market period and bull market period) the p 
value for this test differs from zero, which implies that random effect cross-
sections should be used when running the regressions.   
 
3.4.2 Two-Stage Least Square Regression 
Studies that take the endogeneity problem into account treat the ownership 
structure as endogenous to determine if it will affect the firm performance. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) used a fixed effects panel data and instrumental 
variables to examine the possibility of an endogeneity determined relation. This 
approach is conducted in our study as well, not only because of earlier studies but 
because the cross-sections with random effects gives no plausible results. As 
mentioned earlier, instrumental variables first need to be chosen before running 
the two-stage least square regression. The variables CEO absolute ownership and 
CEO relative ownership will be replaced with the instrumental variables, volatility 
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in stock price and S,G&A (Selling, General and Administration fees) to sales, 
when taking endogeneity into account.  
 
Volatility in stock price:  
Volatility in stock price is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus volatility. 
Volatility measures the degree of fluctuation in the share price during the previous 
twelve months based on the last 52 weekly values. Volatility is calculated on a 
standard deviation of the price and is a measure of its dispersion around the 
twelve month average (Datastream). Both Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Loederer 
and Martin (1997) included this variable in their research. We argue that since the 
volatility in stock price might affect Tobin‟s Q but is less correlated than the 
ownership variables, this instrumental variable is suitable to replace one of the 
ownership variables. Furthermore, taking firm specific risk into account 
incorporates the fact that there are different levels of risk associated with investing 
in different companies. Demsetz and Villalonga concludes that higher level of 
firm-specific risk “indicate better prospects to profit from inside information, 
and, therefore, a stronger causation effect that runs from variations in (expected) 
firm performance to variations in management shareholdings” (2001:15). 
 
SG&A-to-Sales:  
SG&A-to-Sales is the sum of all direct and indirect selling expenses and all 
general and administrative expenses of a company reported in the annual report. 
SG&A is divided by sales. In the regression model, it is computed as the natural 
logarithm of one plus SG&A-to-sales. Earlier studies have included this variable 
in various forms. We believe however, that the most suitable for our regression is 
SG&A-to-Sales as it is taking the size of the firm into account in terms of sales. 
Furthermore, it includes both advertising, which is quite a discretionary expense, 
and more general expenses, all helping to refine our proxies for the scope for 
discretionary spending, which is crucial according to Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
 
When the instrumental variables are chosen it is possible to run the Two-least 
square regression in Eviews. The regression is run with the same model as before, 
but the variables tested for endogeneity, are replaced in the second step of the 
model with the instrumental variables, which is done by Eviews automatically. As 
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mentioned, cross-section random effects are no longer used; it is replaced by 
cross-section fixed effects instead.  
 
3.4.3 Econometrical Sources of Error 
When analyzing a set of data through regressions it is necessary to examine 
whether there are statistical errors that impact the relationship. There are five 
assumptions underlying the OLS-method that should not be violated: (i) errors 
have zero mean; (ii) the variance of errors is constant and finite over all values of 
x; (iii) the errors are statistically independent of one another; (iv) there is no 
relationship between the error and the corresponding x variate; (v) the error term 
is normally distributed.  (Brooks, 2002)  
 
The first assumption, that the errors have zero mean, is valid due to the fact that 
an intercept is included in the model (Brooks, 2002). The second assumption, 
which is the assumption of homoscedasticity, is not violated. When running panel 
regressions the effects of heteroscedasticity is reduced and cross sectional weights 
reduce standard errors for heteroscedasticity in the cross sectional data (Gujarati, 
2006). In addition, to be completely sure, a White‟s test to detect 
heteroscedasticity is conducted and no sign of heteroscedasticity is noticed. 
 
It is usually not necessary to test for autocorrelation when the length of data is as 
short as in this study; however we have tested for autocorrelation through a 
Durbin-Watson test without showing any sign of autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2006). 
Hence, assumption three is also fulfilled in our sample. 
 
The fourth assumption, which concerns x-variables that are non-stochastic, means 
that the x-variables should be exogenous and thus be determined by factors 
outside the equation. Moreover, the relationship should be one-way, and this is 
tested for using absolute ownership as dependent variable and firm performance 
as the independent variable (Brooks, 2002). In order to correct for the 
econometrical errors found violating the fourth assumption, the 2SLS model is 
conducted.  
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The fifth assumption, that the residuals are normally distributed with zero as a 
mean, holds due to our large sample. This can further be concluded when studying 
the low values for skewness. Lower skewness values are received when five 
outliers with extreme deviations are removed. Removing outliers is, according to 
Brooks (2002), the best way to make sure the fifth assumption is not violated.  
 
Implicitly, it is necessary to examine whether the regression models suffers from 
multicollinearity. However, there is no single measure of multicollinearity, thus 
we cannot be completely sure that multicollinearity does not exist. According to 
Gujarati (2006), a good way is to study the correlations between the different 
explanatory variables and if the correlation is 0.8 or above, the model probably 
suffers from multicollinearity. The correlation between the explanatory variables 
is low, except between absolute and relative ownership (Table 3.2). The high 
relationship between these two variables are in accordance with our expectations, 
0.6 might even suggest some degree of multicollinearity. Most correlations are 
below 0.20 which means that the multiple-regression model should not suffer 
from multicollinearity.  
 
 
To be completely certain a second method is used in addition, Klein‟s rule of 
thumb (Table 3.3) 
 
Table 3.3 Klein's Rule of Thumb on Multicollinearity 
Regression model  Dependent variable        R
2
 R
2
 adj. Comparison  
Regular model  Tob Q  0.342 0.333   
Auxiliary regression 1  Absolute ownership  0.316 0.309 R
2
>R
2
* 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix     
        
  Tob_Q Ab_own Rel_own Size Lev OMXS Option 
Tob_Q  1  0.125698 -0.054352  0.120089 -0.270769  0.161154  0.042210 
Ab_own  0.125698  1  0.606049  0.025761  0.069432  0.078023 -0.185501 
Rel_own -0.054352  0.606049  1 -0.214229  0.145548 -0.046472 -0.208850 
Size  0.120089  0.025761 -0.214229  1 -0.164783  0.201271 -0.039243 
Lev -0.270769  0.069432  0.145548 -0.164783  1 -0.107178 -0.167621 
OMXS  0.161154  0.078023 -0.046472  0.201271 -0.107178  1 -0.085868 
Option  0.042210 -0.185501 -0.208850 -0.039243 -0.167621 -0.085868  1 
CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
33 
 
Auxiliary regression 2  Relative ownership  0.241 0.233 R2>R2* 
Auxiliary regression 3  Leverage  0.113 0.103 R2>R2* 
Auxiliary regression 4  Size  0.281 0.275 R2>R2* 
Auxiliary regression 5  OMX_bench  0.063 0.053 R2>R2* 
Auxiliary regression 6  CEO option  0.033 0.0229 R2>R2* 
 
Auxiliary regressions are created by using the different independent variables as 
the dependent variables, for example auxiliary regression 1 represents the model:  
 
Absolute ownership = c + relative ownership + leverage + size + omxs_bench + ceo opt. 
 
Auxiliary regression 2 is the same model but relative ownership is the dependent 
variable instead, and so on. The determination coefficients (R
2
) for the auxiliary 
regressions are compared with the determination coefficient for the regular model.  
As can be seen, all determination coefficients for the auxiliary regressions are 
lower than that of the regular model, which means that our model does not suffer 
from multicollinearity. (Brooks, 2002) 
 
3.5 Criticism on the Methodology  
When the regression model was conducted, cross-section with random effects was 
used when running the OLS regressions due to different reasons. However, when 
the Two-stage least square model was used, cross-sections with fixed effects were 
used due to the implausible results and the lacking possibility of conducting 
statistical tests with the random effects model. The cross-sections fixed effects 
model uses the data less effective and standard errors are higher. (Gujarati, 2006) 
 
Further criticism is that only one performance measure is used, the forward-
looking Tobin‟s Q. In some studies a backward-looking measure such as 
accounting profit rate is also included. The reason for that is to test the robustness 
of the reported results. However, a second measure is neglected since we choose 
to follow Hermalin et al. (1991), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) that 
only use Tobin‟s Q as performance measure. 
 
CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
34 
 
Lastly, the methodologies used in previous studies of this topic have been 
differing from case to case, which makes comparisons with other studies limited 
since different and opposing results are characterising the research area.   
 
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
High reliability means that different and independent measures of the same 
phenomenon generate the same or practically the same results. A research paper 
should if it has a high degree of reliability generate the same result if performed 
again. (Bryman and Bell, 2003) As mentioned earlier, sources for data gathering 
have been chosen carefully. Datastream is deemed to be reliable due to its size 
and due to the fact that information is collected from external annual reports 
controlled by Swedish corporate law. Moreover, CEO ownership has been 
collected manually from annual reports which are bound to accounting laws and 
restrictions further securing reliability.  
 
Only having reliable information is not enough. The methodology must also have 
a high validity, which means that we examine what we believe we examine 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Getting high validity is difficult if the used information 
has been collected for other purposes. Hence, all information has been collected 
by the authors (Halvorsen 1992). Our chosen method is in many aspects the same 
as for previous, similar studies. Tobin‟s Q is the general choice of performance 
measure when examining ownership and its relation to firm performance. Control 
variables included are in large part the same as in similar studies. Because of this, 
the chosen method should be valid.  
 
3.6.1 Analysis of excluded observations 
Before outliers are removed, 67 companies have been excluded from our sample 
which gives us a total sample of 69 companies (Appendix 1) and 461 
observations. This means that our study only covers approximately 50% of the 
total sample. Some of them are excluded since they are financial companies and 
others because they are not founded in Sweden. However, some companies are 
excluded since they are not listed during the whole period which may induce 
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some bias problems. For example, survivorship bias may exist in the sample 
meaning that firms excluded may be performing worse than the firms included, 
because of bankruptcies and downgrades to Small Cap etc. This implies that 
overall performance may be overestimated (Brown et al., 1992). However, quite 
many of the excluded companies in the sample have been listed at OMX Nasdaq 
Large and Mid Cap after the year 2000, thus these observations will not give us a 
survivorship bias. It is reasonable to believe that these companies had positive 
abnormal returns initially since public offerings and change of listings increase 
liquidity and availability for investors, which is supported by studies by Eubank 
and Markese (1983). They found that when companies are listed on more liquid 
equity markets, where average market values are significantly higher, the value of 
the newly listed companies tend to increase. This will outweigh the survivorship 
bias problem to some extent.  
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4. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
 
 
In this section the empirical findings will firstly be analyzed with the help of 
descriptive statistics and then with an ordinary least square regression. Finally, a 
two-stage least square regression will be used in order to examine the possibility 
that the ownership is endogeneity determined. The analysis will be based on 
theories outlined in the theoretical section.  
 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the main features of the collection of 
data. This is done in order to give the reader a better overview and understanding 
of the sample and results in general. Furthermore, through the descriptive 
statistics, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. The results will first be 
presented in total, secondly in a review divided by years and last of all will the 
sample be presented in a table divided into quartiles for the dependent as well as 
the most important independent variables.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics     
        
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Tob_Q 483 0.54 9.60 1.71 1.31 3.31 12.64 
Ab_own 483 0.000 14.319 0.197 1.086 9.104 94.04 
Rel_own 483 0.000 0.850 0.050 0.153 3.753 13.611 
Size 483 0.25 779.80 23.41 59.33 6.977 67.37 
Lev 483 0.0000 9.3000 0.8434 1.0460 3.711 20.726 
OMXS 483 -0.380 0.340 0.069 0.244 -0.606 -0.950 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
483             
Absolute ownership and size (market value) is denominated in million SEK 
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Studying the different variables we can see that skewness is positive for all 
variables except OMX Benchmark index (Table 4.1). When skewness is positive 
the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the right of the distribution figure, 
which means that there are many observations below the mean. Worth to notice is 
that skewness is very high for absolute ownership, which indicates that the 
average CEO holds much lower ownership level than the mean, thus a few CEOs 
with large ownership stakes influence the sample heavily. In fact looking at the 
mean, the average CEO would have approximately SEK 197M in stock holdings 
in her firm, while the median holding is only SEK 1.9M. In relative terms the 
CEO in average holds 5% of the company she works for. Moreover, the kurtosis, 
which is a measure of the peakedness of the probability distribution, is positive for 
all variables except market return. Higher kurtosis means that the distribution has 
a sharper peak and longer tails and that more of the variance is due to infrequent 
extreme deviations.  
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - Variable Summary  
YEAR Tob_Q Ab_own Rel_own Size Lev OMXS Option 
2000 Mean 1.81 154.55 0.0567 25655.07 1.00 -0.05 0.67 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.22 77.07 0.0190 11520.11 0.16   0.06 
Median 1.20 2.00 0.0010 4250.00 0.60   1.00 
2001 Mean 1.64 121.27 0.0552 21305.20 1.03 -0.13 0.70 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.17 74.08 0.0185 6850.38 0.15   0.06 
Median 1.16 1.61 0.0005 3265.01 0.71   1.00 
2002 Mean 1.35 125.16 0.0601 13955.20 0.96 -0.38 0.70 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.10 91.22 0.0201 3286.61 0.13   0.06 
Median 1.08 1.00 0.0004 3041.91 0.67   1.00 
2003 Mean 1.58 145.11 0.0508 17959.35 0.90 0.30 0.70 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.12 108.71 0.0192 4355.48 0.13   0.06 
Median 1.26 1.33 0.0004 4230.79 0.60   1.00 
2004 Mean 1.68 202.39 0.0451 22093.77 0.75 0.17 0.58 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.11 134.81 0.0176 5833.10 0.10   0.06 
Median 1.36 1.49 0.0004 5578.39 0.51   1.00 
2005 Mean 1.84 264.66 0.0424 28477.97 0.61 0.34 0.55 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.16 160.26 0.0175 7149.52 0.07   0.06 
Median 1.43 3.00 0.0004 10555.79 0.41   1.00 
2006 Mean 2.04 365.57 0.0401 34454.27 0.65 0.23 0.49 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.19 212.08 0.0174 7938.16 0.10   0.06 
Median 1.57 4.22 0.0004 14332.71 0.38   0.00 
Total Mean 1.71 196.96 0.0500 23414.40 0.84 0.07 0.63 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
0.06 49.41 0.0070 2699.79 0.05   0.02 
Median 1.26 1.92 0.0005 5374.52 0.58   1.00 
Absolute ownership and size (market value) is denominated in million SEK 
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When dividing the sample by years (table 4.2) we can see that the average Tobin‟s 
Q and its development over time follows the OMX Benchmark index. During our 
bear market period the average Tobin‟s Q is declining while it increases during 
the bull market period. Further on, the CEO ownership in relative terms is 
somewhat constant around 5% while in absolute terms it follows the OMX 
Benchmark index, which is logical. An interesting observation is that the average 
leverage of the sample also seems to follow the OMX Benchmark index. In our 
bull market period the average leverage declines which means that during good 
market conditions, companies in our sample seems to pay down debt. Logically, 
the median market value also follows the OMX Benchmark index with declines in 
market value during our bear market period and increase during our bull market 
period. Option holdings by CEOs seem to have declined in popularity during the 
total period, from 70% in 2003 to 50% in 2006. Whether this depends on the 
market conditions or the discussions in media about CEO option holdings is left 
unsaid.  
 
When analyzing our data further, trying to see relationships between well-
performing and mal-performing companies, the data is divided into quartiles. 
Describing the data using quartiles means that when, for example, Tobin‟s Q is 
used as the base for sorting out the quartiles, Q1 includes the 25 % of the 
observations with the lowest Tobin‟s Q values. Similarly, Q4 includes the 25 % 
with the highest Tobin‟s Q values.    
 
4.1.1 Tobin’s Q 
When using Tobin‟s Q as the separator for quartiles, we can see that the average 
relative ownership is significantly higher in Q1 where Tobin‟s Q is low (Table 
4.3). This is contradictive to agency theory which suggests that when the CEO‟s 
interest is in line with the owners, the performance of the company will improve 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, previous research is not supported 
by our findings. However, this result has been heavily impacted by five 
companies (Appendix 1), where each company‟s CEO is the principal owner and 
where Tobin‟s Q is relatively low. The low Q-values could be described by the 
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company‟s businesses and do probably not depend on the level of CEO 
ownership. Studying the median values instead, both in relative and absolute 
terms, the result is opposing and our study seems to fit with the agency theory 
suggesting that higher CEO ownership should imply better firm performance 
since the CEO interest will be in line with other shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Our results show that the highest CEO ownership can be found 
in Q4 where Tobin‟s Q is the highest, this result support e.g. Morck et al. (1983)  
 
Table 4.3: Quartile Separator – Tobin’s Q 
         
Quartile Tob_Q Ab_own Rel_own Size Lev Option  
  Q1 Mean 0.91 525.36 0.0853 11914.88 1.096 0.628  
Median 0.93 1.15 0.0004 5718.04 0.691 1.000  
Std. 
Deviation 
0.11 2078.33 0.2232 16449.70 1.198 0.485  
  Q2 Mean 1.14 63.44 0.0547 15537.03 1.086 0.554  
Median 1.12 2.24 0.0005 5338.79 0.800 1.000  
Std. 
Deviation 
0.07 213.45 0.1533 25383.15 1.330 0.499  
Q3 Mean 1.50 51.73 0.0243 22815.85 0.653 0.661  
Median 1.46 1.37 0.0004 5520.22 0.496 1.000  
Std. 
Deviation 
0.17 196.68 0.0903 41566.80 0.545 0.475  
Q4 Mean 3.29 146.89 0.0358 43556.31 0.536 0.658  
Median 2.48 3.78 0.0009 4865.58 0.243 1.000  
Std. 
Deviation 
1.83 427.54 0.1023 104821.90 0.802 0.476  
Total Mean 1.71 196.96 0.0500 23414.40 0.843 0.625  
Median 1.26 1.92 0.0005 5374.52 0.582 1.000  
Std. 
Deviation 
1.31 1085.80 0.1530 59333.92 1.046 0.485  
Absolute ownership and size (market value) is denominated in million SEK 
 
In our sample, CEOs hold options on their company‟s stock in around 65% of the 
cases. The CEO option holdings seem to be uncorrelated to firm performance. 
Furthermore, size seems to be positively correlated to firm performance, where 
the highest market values can be found where firm performance is highest. 
Lowest market values are found where firm performance is lowest. 
 
When studying Q3 and Q4 compared to Q1 and Q2, leverage seems to be 
significantly lower when Tobin‟s Q is higher. Corporate finance theory explains 
this behaviour with the pecking order theory which suggests that when firm 
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performance is high, companies can use retained earnings to finance its operations 
instead of taking up new debt which is more expensive (Mayer and Majluf, 1984). 
 
4.1.2 Absolute Ownership 
When CEO‟s absolute ownership is used as the base when dividing the quartiles, 
it means Q4 is the quartile with the 25% highest ownership stakes in absolute 
terms. Using the mean of Tobin‟s Q we can see that this value is the highest in Q3 
(Table 4.4). The firm performance increases with higher absolute CEO ownership 
up to a certain limit where it declines. This is in line with e.g. Morck et al. (1988), 
stating that after a certain ownership level the alignment of interest loses its value 
and the CEO starts to entrench herself. Thus, this result empirically supports 
earlier studies (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999) which implies that both the incentive 
alignment theory as well as the entrenchment theory co-exists. 
 
Table 4.4: Quartile Separator  - Absolute Ownership  
        
Quartile Tob_Q Ab_own Rel_own Size Lev Option 
  Q1 Mean 1.413 0.1914 0.0002 13214.34 0.784 0.694 
Median 1.216 0.1598 0.0000 4568.96 0.603 1.000 
Std. Deviation 0.679 0.1643 0.0004 22359.88 0.911 0.462 
  Q2 Mean 1.643 1.3329 0.0007 31431.56 0.696 0.661 
Median 1.233 1.1963 0.0003 8862.63 0.465 1.000 
Std. Deviation 1.276 0.5977 0.0011 80475.33 0.804 0.475 
Q3 Mean 1.947 11.6434 0.0134 29024.75 0.977 0.603 
Median 1.383 7.0608 0.0014 5208.68 0.730 1.000 
Std. Deviation 1.616 10.6775 0.0444 57946.23 1.322 0.491 
Q4 Mean 1.917 964.2622 0.2314 21557.50 0.947 0.505 
Median 1.233 221.4192 0.0980 4056.04 0.634 1.000 
Std. Deviation 1.539 2274.8032 0.2707 66018.09 1.094 0.503 
Total Mean 1.705 196.9589 0.0500 23414.40 0.843 0.625 
Median 1.257 1.9163 0.0005 5374.52 0.582 1.000 
Std. Deviation 1.309 1085.7988 0.1530 59333.92 1.046 0.485 
Absolute ownership and size (market value) is denominated in million SEK 
 
Market value and absolute CEO ownership seems to be uncorrelated. Leverage 
seems to be higher for the firms in Q3 and Q4 compared to companies in Q1 and 
Q2. This is in line with research by Agrawal et al. (1987) concluding that there is 
a positive relationship between CEO ownership level and financial leverage. 
CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
41 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that CEO option holdings decrease with higher 
absolute ownership level. The cause of this might be that the higher ownership 
level, the more risk averse the CEO will be and the less she will earn from a 
volatile stock. This is in line with theory by Smith and Stulz's (1985). 
 
4.1.3 Relative Ownership 
Our results from studying the quartiles for median relative ownership do also 
support the incentive alignment theory and the entrenchment theory (e.g. Morck et 
al., 1988). The findings (table 4.5) suggest that when relative ownership increases, 
the firm performance increases until Q4 where the firm performance declines. 
Regarding the independent variable leverage, our findings suggest the same result 
as with ownership in absolute terms. The level of debt on companies‟ balance 
sheets increases with higher relative ownership, which is supported by the 
findings by Agrawal et al. (1987).  
As with absolute ownership the companies in Q4 less often use CEO option 
holdings as a way to remunerate CEOs. Whether this is because these companies‟ 
CEOs already are major shareholders and thus do not need further remuneration to 
become motivated, is just pure speculation.  
Table 4.5: Quartile Separator - Relative Ownership 
Quartile Tob_Q Ab_own Rel_own Size Lev Option 
  Q1 Mean 1.6109 0.84 0.0000 45071.6 0.7064 0.6369 
Median 1.2466 0.25 0.0000 16247.0 0.5063 1 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.2223 1.58 0.0000 83898.2 0.84562 0.48242 
  Q2 Mean 1.7318 40.52 0.0006 19011.3 0.6898 0.7178 
Median 1.3198 1.61 0.0005 5246.2 0.4976 1 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.2423 268.37 0.0004 52936.1 0.73434 0.45146 
Q3 Mean 1.8147 135.13 0.0501 7484.9 1.1164 0.5735 
Median 1.2824 39.84 0.0155 2678.2 0.7315 1 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.5168 239.34 0.0679 13110.0 1.43911 0.49639 
Q4 Mean 1.5455 2593.24 0.6391 4301.0 1.1918 0.2593 
Median 1.0971 670.71 0.6331 2320.1 0.8314 0 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.0451 3839.43 0.1378 4308.0 1.05015 0.44658 
Total Mean 1.7054 196.96 0.0500 23414.4 0.8434 0.6253 
Median 1.2569 1.92 0.0005 5374.5 0.5821 1 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.309 1085.80 0.1530 59333.9 1.04602 0.48456 
Absolute ownership and size (market value) is denominated in million SEK 
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4.1.4 Concluding Comments on Descriptive Statistics 
When the descriptive statistics have been studied there are some conclusions that 
can be drawn. Earlier studies suggesting a relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance have been supported by our study of the relationship 
between Swedish CEO ownership and firm performance. Tobin‟s Q, i.e firm 
performance, increases until the fourth quartile where it starts to decline. (Morck 
et al., 1988) Our results also suggest that leverage increase along the degree of 
CEO ownership, which is in accordance with earlier studies by e.g. Agrawal et al. 
(1987). The usage of CEO options seems to decline with increased ownership.  
 
Moreover, after the descriptive statistics have been studied it can be concluded 
that outliers affect the overall results. Therefore we determine to exclude the five 
companies with the most extreme values (Appendix 1) when conducting the 
regressions. 
 
4.2 OLS Regression Analysis  
The regressions are run for the three different periods; total sample, bear market 
period and bull market period. Regressions will be run for the three periods using 
both Tobin‟s Q and Ownership separately as the dependent variables.  
 
4.2.1 Tobin’s Q as Dependent Variable 
4.2.1.1 Total Sample  
The OLS regression covering the total sample is conducted in order, not only to 
be a good tool for evaluating the two different periods, but to evaluate the 
relationship covering all of the panel data. The regression is a cross-section 
regression with random effects, which has been concluded through different tests 
in the methodology section. The regression explains approximately 33.3 % of 
fluctuations in firm performance and the regression is significant at a 1 % level 
when studying the F-statistics (Table 4.6). The determination coefficient (R
2
 
adjusted) is somewhere in between recent studies on other national markets. 
Welch (2003) received an adjusted R
2
-value of 18 % in her study on the 
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Australian market and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) received a value of 44 % 
when they studied the American market.  
 
Table 4.6 OLS Regression - Total Sample  
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3.292346 0.289961 -11.35443 0.0000 
Ab_own 0.016280 0.007747 2.101408 0.0362 
Rel_own 0.103754 0.218858 0.474068 0.6357 
Lev 0.213428 0.041235 5.175910 0.0000 
Size 0.219193 0.018920 11.58494 0.0000 
OMXS 0.084666 0.040595 2.085639 0.0376 
Option -0.032391 0.028576 -1.133519 0.2576 
          
R-squared 0.342068   S.E. of regres 0.207606 
Adj R-
squared 
0.333373   F-stat 39.34020 
      Prob (F-stat) 0.000000 
 
The CEO ownership in absolute terms has an impact on firm performance, which 
can be statistically supported on a 5 % level. Relative ownership, however, is not 
statistical significant when the total sample is covered. The impact of absolute 
ownership is not that vast; 1 % change in absolute ownership increases firm 
performance in terms of Tobin‟s Q with 0.016 %. The results support Morck et al. 
(1988) and subsequent empirical evidence (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999). The 
fact that relative ownership is not significant while the absolute ownership is 
could have several explanations. Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest that when the 
CEO has a large absolute ownership she will not be risk neutral meaning that she 
will act more in line with shareholders. In this way will the firm perform on a 
higher level and thus support agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, 
when taking the control variable size into consideration, Morck et al. (1988) 
suggest that it is more difficult to own a larger stake of a bigger firm and thus, 
make the relative ownership less important. 
 
The variables leverage and size are significant on a 1 % level, meaning that with 
more than 99 % probability do these variables have an impact on firm 
performance. When leverage increases 1 %, Tobin‟s Q increases 0.22 % and size 
has almost an identical impact on firm performance. The OMXS benchmark is 
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also significant on a 5% level. Moreover, the impact of CEO option holding on 
firm performance cannot be statistically supported. 
 
4.2.1.2 Bear Market and Bull Market Comparison 
When dividing our total sample into the two different sub-groups, we will be able 
to see if there are any obvious differences between the two different market 
conditions.  
 
Table 4.7: Bear and Bull market 
 
The estimated equation for the bear market period describes 46 % of the changes 
in firm performance. The significant variables in this model are absolute 
ownership, size and OMXS Benchmark index. Absolute ownership and size are 
significant on 1 % level while OMXS Benchmark index is significant on a 5 % 
level. The regression for our bull market period does only describe approximately 
30 % of the changes in firm performance and the significant variables are size and 
leverage. Size is significant on a 5% level while leverage is significant on a 1 % 
level. Both variables have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Our result indicates a relationship between a CEO‟s ownership and firm 
performance during our bear market period, but not during our bull market period. 
One suggestion is that during a bull market period, almost all stocks will increase 
and the CEO‟s alignment is not as important as during a bear market period. It can 
 Bull market  
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
-2.803615 0.347367 -8.071056 0.0000 
0.008949 0.008554 1.046215 0.2964 
-0.525225 0.309076 -1.699340 0.0905 
0.186575 0.046785 3.987912 0.0001 
0.199668 0.022498 8.875085 0.0000 
-0.254033 0.161315 -1.574762 0.1165 
-0.047026 0.029615 -1.587917 0.1135 
    
R-squared 0.305172 S.E. of 
regres 
0.151117 
Adj R-
squared 
0.289013 F-stat 18.88578 
  Prob (F-
stat) 
0.000000 
  Bear market  
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3.333000 0.407912 -8.170882 0.0000 
Ab_own 0.062062 0.012602 4.924644 0.0000 
Rel_own -0.228737 0.297178 -0.769697 0.4424 
Lev -0.057064 0.066814 -0.854063 0.3942 
Size 0.207033 0.026797 7.725969 0.0000 
OMXS 0.218800 0.057987 3.773272 0.0002 
Option 0.079732 0.044587 1.788231 0.0753 
     
 R-squared 0.472308 S.E. of 
regres 
0.156011 
 Adj R-
squared 
0.455556 F-stat 28.19392 
   Prob (F-
stat) 
0.000000 
CEO Ownership – Relevant for Firm Performance? 
 
45 
 
also be concluded that our model explains the development in Tobin‟s Q and 
other variables better during the bear market period than during the bull market 
period. 
 
During our bear market period, the impact of leverage on firm performance is not 
significant, while it is significant in our bull market period. If a company in our 
sample increases its leverage during a bull market period it will have a positive 
effect on firm performance. The explanation for this could be that during a bull 
market period a company might have more investment possibilities, which means 
that increased debt probably will increase firm performance. (Koller et al, 2005).  
 
Prior research in the US stock markets suggests that the relationship between size 
and firm performance may be partially dependent on the general direction of the 
market (Kim and Burnie 2002; Guo 2004). However, our results indicate that the 
impact of size is almost identical between the two different market conditions 
(Table 4.7), which means that size and its impact on firm performance in our 
sample is independent of current market conditions.    
 
Lastly, CEO option holding seems to have a negative impact on firm 
performance; however, the relationship cannot be statistically supported on a 5% 
level.   
 
4.2.2 Absolute Ownership as Dependent Variable 
Our regression models indicate that absolute ownership has an impact on firm 
performance in the total sample and also during our bear market period. Since 
studies by Kole (1996) and Cho (1998) show that firm performance has an impact 
on ownership level and not the vice versa. This means that reversed causality may 
exist in the regression model and it is meaningful to run a regression with the 
absolute ownership as the dependent variable. A regression model is run in order 
to examine Tobin Q‟s impact on ownership and we use the firm performance 
(Tobin‟s Q) as an explanatory variable (see table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 OLS Regression - Absolute Ownership as 
Dependent Variable 
      
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
C -1.501053 2.009515 -0.746973 0.4555  
Tob_Q 0.751640 0.281441 2.670685 0.0078  
Size 0.618899 0.126695 4.884967 0.0000  
Lev -0.644665 0.275574 -2.339357 0.0197  
OMXS -0.151891 0.272404 -0.557595 0.5774  
Option -0.024165 0.190196 -0.127051 0.8990  
           
R-squared 0.152575   S.E. of regres 1.332830  
Adj R-
squared 
0.143262   F-stat 16.38410  
      Prob (F-stat) 0.000000  
 
 
In the regression, firm performance is significant for absolute ownership on a 1% 
level. This means that absolute ownership and its dependence of Tobin‟s Q is 
significantly stronger than vice versa. This may imply that when firm performance 
is improving, CEOs seem to prefer more equity compensation when they expect 
their firm to perform well. Our result is close to the study by Kole (1996) and Cho 
(1998). Reversed causality may exist in the regression model and we should, 
according to Demsetz (1983) calculate if the ownership structure is endogeneity 
determined by exogenous factors such as market forces. As mentioned, this result 
is for the total sample; however the same results are generated when testing for 
the bull as well as for the bear market sample (Appendix 2).        
 
4.3 Two-Stage Least Square Regression 
4.3.1 Results 
After examining the impact of ownership by Swedish CEOs on firm performance, 
a regression model is run to examine the possibility that the observed relation is 
endogeneity determined. This regression is performed with a Two-stage least 
square (S2LS) model, with fixed cross-sections. 
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Table 4.10 Two-Stage Least Square - Total sample 
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -10.36250 11.61404 -0.892239 0.3731 
Ab_own -0.984994 0.947339 -1.039748 0.2994 
Rel_own -52.92880 48.33504 -1.095040 0.2745 
Size 1.274883 1.171447 1.088297 0.2775 
Lev -0.662815 0.857900 -0.772602 0.4405 
OMXS -0.634806 0.750575 -0.845759 0.3985 
Option 0.257447 0.536299 0.480043 0.6316 
          
R-squared -9.213136   S.E. of regres 1.704282 
Adj R-squared -11.686630   F-stat 2867.202 
Instrument rank 64.000000   Prob (F-stat) 0.000000 
 
 
Our results (Table 4.10) indicate that ownership structure is not significant when 
taking the endogeneity possibility into account. This means that our findings from 
the Two-stage least square model suggest that the result from our OLS regression, 
indicating a relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance, does not 
hold when taking endogeneity into consideration. Moreover it contradicts with 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) study that calculated for endogeneity but still 
found a significant relation between CEO ownership and firm performance. 
Ownership in both relative and absolute terms can be rejected with high 
probability due to high p-values for all of the three periods (Table 4.10-11). The 
result support Demsetz‟ (1983) theory and Himmelberg et al.‟s (1999) empirical 
evidence, stating that insider ownership is endogeneity determined. Our study 
indicates that the relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance on 
the Swedish market is not relevant. This conclusion on the Swedish market is 
consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) on the American 
market as well as Welch (2003) on the Australian market.  
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Table 4.11 Two-Stage Least Square – Bear and Bull Market Period 
 
4.4 Concluding Analysis 
After examining the OLS-regressions, during the different market conditions, we 
can conclude that there are some differences. For the total sample we find a 
significant relation between Swedish CEO ownership and firm performance, 
which supports Morck et al. (1988) and others. The relation is positive with 
increasing firm performance at greater CEO ownership levels and then a negative 
relation beyond a specific limit, according to our descriptive statistics. This result 
confirms the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as well as the 
entrenchment theory (Demsetz, 1983), and it also confirms that the relation is 
shaped as an invers-U (McConnel and Servaes, 1990). Since it is the absolute 
ownership and not the relative ownership variable that is significant, it means that 
it is the amount of money owned by the CEO and not the ownership fraction of 
the company that is important. This conclusion is supported by Hall and Liebman 
(1998). 
 
During our bear market period our model can explain fluctuations in the variables 
better than during our bull market period. This could be explained by the market 
conditions, where the bull market induce increasing stock prices in general which 
  Bear market   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 12.08262 150.6183 0.080220 0.9362 
Ab_own 1.130104 8.638392 0.130823 0.8962 
Rel_own 56.98228 676.9143 0.084179 0.9331 
Size -1.366683 14.74713 -0.092675 0.9264 
Lev -2.933392 28.43995 -0.103143 0.9181 
OMXS 2.874692 30.28287 0.094928 0.9246 
Option 2.886224 30.97938 0.093166 0.9260 
     
R-squared -20.042955 S.E. of regres 2.995104  
Adj R-squared -33.673051 F-stat 9.83E+14  
Instrument 
rank 
58.000000 Prob (F-stat) 0.000000  
 Bull market  
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
-3.685068 6.897104 -0.534292 0.5940 
-0.195119 0.417808 -0.467005 0.6412 
-29.10894 15.64239 -1.860901 0.0648 
0.410158 0.627825 0.653300 0.5146 
-0.043466 0.394864 -0.110078 0.9125 
-0.682949 0.996427 -0.685398 0.4942 
0.327160 0.297280 1.100512 0.2730 
    
R-squared -0.529784 S.E. of 
regres 
0.715680 
Adj R-
squared 
-1.193046 F-stat 2734.348 
Instrument 
rank 
64.000000 Prob (F-
stat) 
0.000000 
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might make the CEO stock holding less important, thus suggesting that her 
alignment of interest is less important during a bull market period. Moreover, the 
lack of significance during bull market period further breath the opportunity that 
the relationship is endogeneity determined since the relationship seems to depend 
on an exogenous force, whether it is bull or bear market.   
 
The variable size has a positive correlation with increased Tobin‟s Q. The 
relationship seems to be independent of the current market conditions; hence our 
result on the Swedish market cannot support studies by Kim and Burnie (2002) 
and Guo (2004). Leverage seems to increase with the level of CEO ownership and 
its impact on firm performance is positive during bull market, but the relationship 
cannot be statistically supported for the bear market period. The last control 
variable, CEO option holding, whose usage has declined during the studied 
period, seems to have a negative impact on firm performance. However, the 
relationship cannot be statistically supported. 
 
When studying the opposite relationship instead, using absolute ownership as 
dependent variable and Tobin‟s Q as independent, we receive a stronger 
significance between the variables. This may imply that CEOs increase their stock 
positions when firm performance is increasing.  Our results confirm Kole (1996) 
and Cho (1998) suggesting that reversal causality exists in the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO ownership. This means that the level of CEO 
ownership does not affect firm performance but vice versa. Moreover, Kole 
(1994) concluded that managers tend to prefer equity compensation when they 
expect their firm to perform well and, consequently, the value of the firm to 
increase. Therefore a Two-stage least square model was run to examine a 
potential endogeneity determined relation. The result from the 2SLS model 
implies that that our proposition about an endogeneity determined relationship can 
be confirmed. In the three examined regression models it can be concluded that 
none of the two ownership variables are significant in any period. This suggests 
that firm performance does not depend on either absolute ownership or relative 
ownership, but on exogenous factors such as market forces.      
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
In this final chapter the conclusion from our performed study will be presented. 
The conclusion is based on our empirical findings and with the theoretical 
framework as foundation. Furthermore, we will also give suggestions for future 
research.    
 
 
 
The aim of this study was to examine if and how the level of CEO ownership 
affect firm performance and if there is a difference whether or not it is a bull or a 
bear market, the question was also if our results would hold when taking 
endogeneity into consideration. 
 
The question concerning the relation insider ownership and firm performance has 
been diligently studied during the last decades. However, this research area is 
lacking consensus regarding the empirical and theoretical conclusions. Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) points out the cause of this by stating that different studies 
use different methods and measures, whereas the results will differ. With this as a 
foundation and the fact that the only study on the Swedish market (Olson and 
Öhlén, 2007) has shortcomings and, in our opinion, is lacking academic strength 
and verification we legitimate our study on the Swedish market. Also the fact that 
no other study has taken the market conditions into consideration makes this study 
important. 
 
The result from our analysis indicates that there is a positive relation between 
Swedish CEO ownership and firm performance. The positive relation concerns 
absolute ownership and not relative ownership and this represents the importance 
of high ownership in amount of money (SEK) and not ownership as a percentage 
of the company. The positive relation between ownership and firm performance 
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that is concluded on the Swedish market supports Morck et al. (1988) as well as 
subsequent studies (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999), thus confirming both the agency 
theory and the entrenchment theory.  
 
Since a positive relation between CEO ownership and firm performance is 
detected during our bear market period but not during the bull market period, we 
suggest that the relation is influenced by the market conditions. Moreover, when 
the reversed relationship was examined we found a stronger significance, 
implying firm performance affect absolute CEO ownership in a higher degree 
than vice versa. Hence, the model is characterized by reversed causality.   
 
These results could have interesting implications for the Swedish business 
community. First of all, from an investor‟s point of view, we believe that our 
results indicate that when a company‟s CEO buys or have a large absolute 
ownership in the company, investors could buy the stock and expect the company 
to have increasing firm performance. Hence, if investors are rational they will buy 
stocks in a company where the CEO is increasing his ownership stake in absolute 
terms. Moreover, this implication should drive the CEOs to buy stocks and 
increase their absolute ownership in the company in order to attract more 
investors, thus it will be a self-fulfilling prophecy when the increased demand will 
drive up the stock prices and in turn increase Tobin‟s Q. 
 
The evidence of reversed causality implicated that the relationship is determined 
by exogenous factors. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) stated with Demsetz (1983) 
theory as foundation, that the relation between CEO ownership and firm 
performance could be influenced by the market forces. Following Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) and Welch (2003) methods calculating for a possibility of an 
endogeneity determined ownership structure, our results support what they say: 
the relation is determined endogenously by exogenous factors and thus the 
relation between CEO ownership and firm performance on the Swedish market is 
determined by factors outside the regression.  
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Even though the relationship cannot be statistically supported when taking 
endogeneity into consideration, the initially found relationship cannot be 
neglected. Still, the relationship has implications for investors and CEOs as it is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy saying more about market efficiency and the degree of 
rationality among investors than it says about the actual impact of CEO ownership 
on firm performance.     
 
5.1 Future Research 
Even though the area of interest alignment and firm performance has been 
frequently studied during the last decades, there are still some gaps to fill. When 
conducting this analysis an early choice was made, Tobin‟s Q was chosen as the 
proxy for firm performance. Through the use of a second measure, the accounting 
profit rate, conclusions can be drawn regarding the robustness of the results. 
Using this measure in combination with Tobin‟s Q, is a suggestion for future 
research on the Swedish market further elaborating on bullish and bearish market 
conditions.   
 
Furthermore, it would be very interesting to get more of a behavioral finance 
aspect on the CEO ownership and its impact on firm performance. In the 
introductory section Carl-Henric Svanberg and Ericsson was mentioned as an 
example of the Pilot School, however we did no further studies on how his action, 
investing a large amount of money in the company when appointed as CEO, 
affected investors. Further on, since our result indicates that the relationship is 
endogeneity determined and thus suggesting that the ownership structure is 
endogeneity determined by exogenous factors we believe it is an even stronger 
motive for researcher to further examine the relationship insider ownership and 
firm performance and to take into account a behavioral finance aspect. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Included firms from Large and Mid Cap – Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
ACTIVE BIOTECH HALDEX RATOS 
ANOTO GROUP HEBA SAAB 
ASSA ABLOY HENNES & MAURITZ SANDVIK 
ATLAS COPCO HEXAGON SAS 
AXFOOD HOLMEN SCA 
AXIS HUFVUDSTADEN SCANIA 
BEIJER ALMA IBS SECTRA 
BILIA INDL.& FINL.SYS. SECURITAS 
B&B TOOLS INDUSTRIVARDEN SKANDITEK 
BOLIDEN INVESTOR SKANSKA 
BROSTROM JM SKF 
BURE EQUITY KINNEVIK SKISTAR 
CARDO KUNGSLEDEN SSAB 
CASTELLUM LUNDBERGFORETAGEN SWECO 
CONCORDIA MARITIME MUNTERS SWEDISH MATCH 
ELECTROLUX NCC TELE2 
ELEKTA NEW WAVE GROUP TELECA 
ERICSSON NIBE INDUSTRIER TELIASONERA 
FABEGE NOLATO TRELLEBORG 
FAGERHULT OMX VOLVO 
FAST PARTNER PARTNERTECH VOSTOK GAS 
GETINGE PEAB WALLENSTAM 
GUNNEBO Q-MED ÖRESUND 
Companies in bold were excluded after descriptive statistics analysis 
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Appendix2 
Dependent variable absolute ownership, Bear and Bull Market period 
  Bear market  
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
C 3.497360 2.834369 1.233911 0.2188 
Tob_Q 1.979921 0.398317 4.970723 0.0000 
Lev 0.696795 0.442325 1.575300 0.1169 
Size 0.250482 0.181048 1.383512 0.1681 
OMXS -0.049165 0.414623 -0.118577 0.9057 
Option -0.573215 0.301805 -1.899292 0.0590 
     
 R-squared 0.209919 S.E. of 
regres 
0.982093 
 Adj R-
squared 
0.189127 F-stat 10.09631 
   Prob (F-
stat) 
0.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bull market  
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
-3.988527 2.448143 -1.629205 0.1045 
0.468084 0.383992 1.218996 0.2240 
-1.125859 0.348162 -3.233718 0.0014 
0.791773 0.152102 5.205548 0.0000 
0.245921 1.269477 0.193719 0.8465 
-0.125461 0.227342 -0.551859 0.5815 
    
R-squared 0.189433 S.E. of 
regres 
1.160220 
Adj R-
squared 
0.173785 F-stat 12.10590 
  Prob (F-
stat) 
0.000000 
